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CHAPTER 1: RESEARCH DESCRIPTION 
1.1. BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM 
The Problem Itself  
“I don't foresee a grand slam on the first pitch where we're going to deliver a fixed capa-
bility for the life of the vehicle.  We've got to be knowledgeable enough to recognize that the envi-
ronments change, threats change, new technology starts to come to pass, and we want to make 
sure this design will allow for that growth in the future.   I think we're at a point in time where you 
really want deep thinking, good ideas that can help influence design, requirements, trade and cost 
at a stage in the program where it can make a difference”. 
Dr. J. Burrow, Executive Director, Marine Corps Systems Command, USMC ACV Team, 
Inside the Navy, March 25, 2013. 
Increasing numbers of U.S. military systems, including ground vehicles and aircraft, are 
undergoing multiple rebuilds and capability upgrades throughout their design service life.  Design 
service life is the summation of the engineering-based original design life plus any Service Life 
Extension Programs, System Enhancement Programs, or rebuild actions (modifications that result 
in additional miles or hours).  Requirements typically specify design lives of 20 years for aircraft, 
30 years for ground systems, and 30-50 years for ships.  As illustrated in Figure 1, many aircraft 
and ground vehicles have extended service lives, driving the need for upgrades that were not 
planned (and could not be planned) when the systems were fielded.  The primary cause of this 
phenomenon is requirement changes driven by threat variations, technology opportunities, and 
mission evolution, much of which could not be forecasted at the original design time.  This drives 
the need for designing in resiliency, by way of “changeability,” that enables unplanned easy and 
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rapid replacement or upgrade of obsolete technologies.  Examples of long-lived major systems that 
have undergone multiple unplanned capability upgrades are described in Appendix A.  The prob-
lem to be addressed by this research is that of systems with design service lives well beyond the 
ability to forecast the specific requirements for the system over the entire life, necessitating multi-
ple iterations of capability upgrades to remain relevant and meet the requirement change needs.  
Accordingly, there is need for planned and systematic insertion of new technologies and capabili-
ties to: i) keep a system relevant, ii) maintain a level of customer value and satisfaction, and iii) 
meet or overcome evolving threat (Kerr et al. 2008).  
 
FIGURE 1. SYSTEMS EXCEEDING DESIGN SERVICE LIFE  
Requirements for military systems typically include growth margin—also referred to as 
“reserve capacity” (RC) and design margin—for crucial functions and limitations (e.g., volume, 
power, and computing).  Changeability, by way of flexibility and agility, is enabled through RC 
(Chalupnik et al. 2013).  The Oliver Hazard Perry-class Guided-Missile Frigate (FFG-7) of the 
U.S. Navy provides an excellent example of the consequences of not achieving RC requirements 
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(Appendix B).  The challenge is in valuing RC for future potential benefits against current costs 
and other burdens (e.g., weight).  The future mission capability need and cost are not fully known, 
making the valuing of future potential enabled by current design a formidable task (Deshmukh 
2012). 
Set-Based Design Background 
Set-Based Design (SBD) is a promising capability supporting engineering resiliency and 
requirement changes during a system’s service life.  SBD is an iterative process in which design 
and requirements evolve in parallel, and in which stakeholders restrict and relax requirements with 
feedback regarding feasible solutions in design space given the requirements (Singer 2009).  It is 
a concurrent engineering process that helps stakeholders understand the interdependencies among 
the requirements and impact on design as they work to develop the performance specification and 
preliminary design (Rapp 2017).  
A practical way of looking at SBD is that it shifts the focus from the typical point-based 
design strategy of selecting the most-promising concept early in the development phase, to that of 
eliminating the inferior ones only when it is determined that they do not meet relevant requirements 
(Malak et al. 2008), carrying forward the remaining potential solutions at each stage.  Figure 2 
shows the general conceptual difference between point-based design and SBD (Miller 1993).  To 
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capitalize on the advantage provided by SBD for promoting product resilience, program invest-
ment needs to be front-loaded to thoroughly explore alternative1 solutions while the design trade-
space is most open. 
 
FIGURE 2. POINT-DESIGN VS. SET-BASED DESIGN CONCEPTS 
1.2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The principal question that this research set out to address is “How can set-based design be 
enhanced and applied to the engineering of resilient systems?”  One aspect of SBD is about defer-
ring decisions during the design process until the information necessary to make those decisions 
is known.  The information could pertain to performance, such as RC, or burdens.  In essence, a 
decision to eliminate a subsystem option is not made until it is reasonably certain that it will not 
                                                     
 
1 The term “alternative” denotes a choice at the system level, whereas the term “option” denotes a choice at 
the capability or subsystem level. 
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meet its associated requirements.  Extended, therefore enhanced, SBD is about the capability to 
defer decisions beyond the design process until after it is fielded, when additional or better infor-
mation is obtained (Figure 3).  The system-set is a set of capability option decisions carried through 
the system’s service life.   
 
FIGURE 3. RC & SYSTEM-SET EXPAND THE ALTERNATE FUTURES SPACE 
With respect to resiliency, this research focuses specifically on the second characteristic of 
resilient systems (Holland 2012)—systems adapted and/or extended to achieve higher levels of 
performance, perform new functions, and/or operate in a wider range of conditions.   
Consider how RC intersects with SBD in two ways. 
1. RC should be considered up-front in the system design process, in order to make an 
informed choice on the initial fielded point-solution.  While it is generally appreciated 
that incorporating RC is a cost-effective objective to pursue, the shortage of support-
ive empirical evidence may be deterring decision-makers from pursuing necessary 
INITIAL SET
Down-select
Down-select
Down-select
Include RC during
the design phase…
Space of  alternate futures 
enabled by RC, the system-set
Threat variations
Technology opportunities
Mission evolution
Point design
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up-front funding.   However, analytical methods for determining a warranted amount 
of RC appear to be lacking. 
2. More fundamentally, designing in RC is equivalent to designing in a future set of 
vehicles.  What is a point design at fielding expands out into a set of potential futures 
through upgrades, to be decided in the future. 
1.3. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this research is to develop a framework that enhances SBD to produce 
engineered resilient systems with cost-effective post-production growth capability by means of 
flexibility and agility, achieved through appropriate types and amounts of RC.  The framework 
will provide decision makers (DMs) and stakeholders with enhanced insight and understanding of 
the trade-space to promote smarter acquisition decisions.  This research aims at enhancing SBD 
by establishing a quantitative capability within an analytical framework that allows DMs and 
stakeholders to adjudicate each system alternative as an single-point design in combination with a 
set of future upgrades, defined as a “system-set.”  The framework will facilitate the comparison of 
all feasible system-set alternatives based on the expected cost of future capability versus associated 
utility. 
The framework is developed in two steps.  First, for Research Objective 1 (RO1), an ana-
lytic framework is established to evaluate existing systems and capability need technology to iden-
tify system-set alternatives that meet critical requirements.  This framework addresses the amount 
of RC necessary for a resilient system with cost-effective capability growth to accommodate asso-
ciated upgrades loosely scheduled against an inexact timetable.  Next, for Research Objective 2 
(RO2), the RO1 framework is expanded for new system development to engineer resilient systems 
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that will facilitate flexible, agile, and cost-effective capability growth in response to uncertain fu-
ture needs.  The production design is evaluated in combination with its affordable set of future 
upgrade options within the SBD paradigm, keeping the potential for future options open by focus-
ing on RC and balancing average unit production cost against change and upgrade costs.  
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The Literature Review identifies the current knowledge state of the following four catego-
ries: Set-Based Design, system resiliency, changeability, and adversarial risk. 
2.1. SET-BASED DESIGN 
The basic premise of SBD is that it can be advantageous for DMs to delay commitment to 
a particular design or sub-system option in favor of gathering knowledge about the problem 
(Singer et al. 2009).  A key limitation of current SBD approaches is that they lack a general means 
for incorporating preference information, particularly to evaluate multi-attribute trade-offs.  A 
more general approach is needed to allow DMs to express their preferences for trade-offs across 
multiple attributes.  Additionally, current SBD uses are primarily qualitative in nature; conse-
quently, more research is needed to create a functioning quantitative SBD trade-space framework 
and facilitating toolset (Malak et al. 2008). 
Capability exists with current system design optimization models, but actual set-based re-
siliency is lacking since analytical mathematical tools, even if combinatorial based, provide only 
“point” solutions.  The constricted point solutions eventually create design issues and unplanned 
changes as the design uncertainty diminishes over time (Rapp 2017).  The U.S. Government Ac-
counting Office (GAO) has recognized the need for a greater diversity of design concepts earlier 
to lower risk and design problems later (Martin 2012).  When coupled with high-speed accurate 
optimization, SBD holds great promise to identify a robust, less failure-prone design set to accom-
plish smarter and less costly changes to a system throughout its service life (Rapp 2017). 
2.2. SYSTEM RESILIENCY 
Holland (2012) characterized a resilient system as follows: 1) it is robust and reliable, i.e., 
it has predictable and reliable performance over a wide range of conditions, and can perform a 
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wide range of missions and functions, 2) it can be adapted and/or extended to achieve higher levels 
of performance, perform new functions, and/or operate in a wider range of conditions, and 3) upon 
suffering damage, it has predictable and incremental loss of performance and function. 
Goerger et al. (2014) assert that “resilient DoD (Department of Defense) systems need to 
be able to leverage new technologies and techniques as they appear, meet changing requirements, 
conform to new environments, and successfully meet the challenges of an adaptive foe.  But, these  
systems  also  need  to  be  manufacturable,  deployable,  sustainable,  modifiable,  and  cost  
effective  to  be  viable  for  inclusion  in  the  force  structure.  Thus,  the  DoD  must  design  its  
weapons  systems  to  be  resilient  at  the  outset.”  They identify the four properties of a resilient 
DoD system as: Repel/Resist/Absorb, Recover, Adapt, and Broad Utility; and recognize the Boe-
ing B-52 aircraft, M113 armored personnel carrier, M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and High-Mo-
bility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) as examples of systems meeting the DoD defi-
nition of resiliency.  Spero et al. (2014) examine Engineering Resilient Systems (ERS), the DoD 
effort to design and build resiliency into its systems, to evaluate the current state of trade-space 
exploration (TSE) processes and tools currently utilized in support of ERS.  They identify the goals 
of ERS as to provide to engineering, warfighting, and acquisition DMs the needed capability to 
manage TSE activities with full and consistent information throughout the life of the systems by: 
i) producing more complete and robust requirements early in the engineering design process, ii) 
making the engineering design process much more efficient and effective, iii) considering the man-
ufacturability of a proposed design explicitly, and iv) establishing baseline resiliency of current 
capabilities.  One of their recommendations for future work is the development of value measures 
for attributes and functions to enable a more formal value-focused thinking approach for TSE. 
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Resilience is also defined as a system’s ability to anticipate, perceive, and respond to sur-
prise and failure (Hollnagel et al. 2006), its capability to survive large perturbations (Fiksel 2003), 
and further defined as a combination of changeability and dependability (Boehm 2016). 
2.3. CHANGEABILITY 
The need for changeability, specifically growth margins, was recognized for computer 
hardware and processing performance as early as 1975.  In practice, unless provisions for adapta-
tion to change are designed into a system, the consequences are often serious (Kossiakoff 1975).  
Changeability is described as having four key aspects: flexibility and agility (easy and rapid 
change), adaptability (a system’s ability to adapt itself to change within its environment), and ro-
bustness (a system’s insensitivity to change within its environment) (Fricke and Schulz 2005). 
These definitions align with the ontological framework for flexibility-related terminology devel-
oped by Ryan et al. (2012).  Furthermore, scalability—defined as the ability to change the level of 
a parameter—is identified as an extending principle for flexibility and agility. The need for quan-
tifying and measuring changeability, and by extension flexibility, agility, adaptability and robust-
ness, is emphasized (Ross et al. 2008, Olewnik et al. 2004); however, Olewnik et al. (2004) claim 
that while there are several metrics for robustness, none exist for adaptability or flexibility in gen-
eral. 
RC is recognized as a significant enabler for changeability (Chalupnik et al. 2013).  For 
the research framework, it is defined as designed-in spare capacity to accommodate additional 
volume, weight, power, cooling, and computing.  These items are usually traded between each 
other and between subsystems (Bahill and Botta 2008).  Literature on RC and design margin in 
military systems is particularly narrow.  RC is examined mainly in applications for health and 
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medicine, road and transportation networks, and energy systems.2  Similarly, existing literature on 
design margin focuses on electronics and computer/information technology.3   
2.4. ADVERSARIAL RISK 
Meeting or overcoming the evolving threat, or adversary, is a driving need for planned and 
systematic insertion of new technologies and capabilities (Kerr et al. 2008).  Daase and Kessler 
(2007) identify four kinds of danger that stem from the known/unknown matrix based on the meth-
odological and empirical knowledge. Threat is known-knowns; risk is known-unknowns; igno-
rance is unknown-knowns; and disaster is unknown-unknowns. Furthermore, two definitions of 
probability are presented—relative frequency and degree of belief - based on definitive notions of 
non-knowledge and uncertainty. Paté-Cornell (1996) differentiates between epistemic 
(knowledge) uncertainty and aleatory or stochastic uncertainty (randomness) and describes prob-
abilistic, i.e., probabilistic risk analysis (PRA), and deterministic methods for addressing risk and 
uncertainty.  While PRA has been practiced for more than 30 years, its application aimed at ter-
rorism risk is less mature (Ezell et al. 2010).  Adversarial risk analysis (ARA) deals with the risk 
analysis of situations in which risks stem from the deliberate actions of intelligent adversaries 
(Rios and Insua 2012).  The more common tools used in ARA include logic trees, which are further 
                                                     
 
2 Of the first 50 returns for a Google Scholar search on “reserve capacity,” 40 addressed health/medical ap-
plications, four addressed road and transportation network applications, and three addressed energy applications.  
None of the returns addressed military systems or ground vehicles. 
3 Of the first 50 returns for a Google Scholar search on “design margin,” 29 returns addressed electronics and 
computer science/information technology applications, six addressed nuclear science applications, and three each for 
chemistry/chemical engineering and optical science applications. None of the returns addressed military systems or 
ground vehicles. 
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divided into fault, attack and success trees, and probability, event and decision trees; influence 
diagrams; Bayesian network analysis; and game theoretical modeling (Ezell et al. 2010; Insua et 
al. 2009; Merrick and Parnell 2011).  Merrick and Parnell (2011) compared these methods in two 
example decisions and expanded the application of decision and event trees to examine a given 
scenario from both the defender’s and attacker’s perspective.  More recently, it’s been recognized 
that the intelligent and adaptive nature of today’s adversary sometimes requires a more dynamic 
approach.  This requirement has resulted in an extension of statistical risk analysis and game theory 
to conduct intelligent ARA (Merrick and Parnell 2011), and has been an argument against the use 
of expert-elicited probabilities for ARA since these probabilities are not static (Ezell et al. 2010). 
A significant gap in the realm of ARA knowledge is the shortage of examples addressing 
tactical scenarios.  The preponderance of articles focus on the strategic or infrastructure level, such 
as weapons of mass destruction, e.g., bioterrorism targeting mass transit systems or high-popula-
tion events, and the power grid, including dams, nuclear reactors, and non-nuclear power stations. 
2.5. LITERATURE REVIEW SYNOPSIS 
The Literature Review identified a need for enhancing SBD to i) allow for an expanded 
trade-space, ii) enable preference or value-based assessment, and iii) extend decision flexibility to 
align with the length of the system’s service life.  Also identified was the need for an improved 
capability for engineering system resiliency through designing for changeability, by means of flex-
ibility and agility, and in turn, reserve capacity.  This need includes the ability to measure levels 
of these attributes from a value-based perspective.  In response to these needs just identified, this 
research addresses creation of a framework to enable resilient system design that will extend de-
cision flexibility for complex long-lived systems. 
13 
 
Also identified was the need for a more tactical focus per ARA to better identify future 
capability need for tactical systems.  Note that it is not within the scope of this research to actually 
estimate adversarial risk, but rather to understand its association with capability need.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
3.1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Consider a system consisting of a finite number of capability need subsystems.  A base 
system (vehicle platform) set is designated
1 2
V = { , , ..., }
m
V V V , and a technology capability subsystem 
set 
1 2
T = { , , ..., }
n
T T T .  Furthermore, portfolios of technology capabilities are designated as P, where 
each portfolio consists of a subset of T, including ∅ (null).  With 2n elements, P constitutes all 
partial states of having every capability.  Each 
iV  launches with an element from P, a technology 
capability base set, labeled 
i Bi
V P .  Likewise for each 
iV  there is a P, labeled ( )iV  , that consists 
of all T that the vehicle platform can support, based on its RC.  Thus, for each 
iV  the associated P 
decomposes into  and B OP P , i.e., base and option elements.  The methodology model consists of 
start states, intermediate states, end states, allowable moves (called actions from here on out), and 
cost and utility functions.  A system-set is a sequence of actions, or path, through the available 
states.  The objective is to select a system-set that is superior with respect to some system-level 
metric, such as “lowest cost.” 
Without loss of generality, the rest of this manuscript focuses on vehicle systems, though 
the methodology holds merit for designing other types of systems as well.  The method begins 
with a vehicle from V, and for each action, either a P is added, subject to the constraints of the 
current vehicle, or there is a change of vehicle.  Assuming that ultimately every capability will be 
implemented ( P ), the expectation is to finish with at least one vehicle platform for which 
( )iP V P  .  Another way to think about it is that each action results in reaching a state from the 
space S that is the tuple of P and V, so S P V  .  Each element of S consists of a vehicle platform 
iV  and portfolio kP .  An example is to have 3 1,3,4{ , }V P as an element in S, where 1,3,4 1 3 4{ , , }P T T T ; PØ  
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indicates that the vehicle platform has not received any capability option.  Next, the cost function 
is the total cost of a system-set, defined as the initial vehicle platform cost plus the cost associated 
with each subsequent action.  To realistically estimate action costs, points in time (epochs, E) are 
identified to designate when those actions are projected to occur.  Lastly, the utility function re-
flects the total utility of a system-set, which is the sum of the utilities associated with each element 
in its respective S.  Cost and utility details are addressed later in this section. 
Figure 4 depicts a notional methodology model for 2m n  , where 
1 2
V = { , }V V , 
1 2
T = { , }T T
, and 
1 2 1 2
{ , , },P T T TT

  .  For each state (oval), the symbols listed from top to bottom represent the 
vehicle platform 
i
V , base technology capabilities 
Bi
P , and technology capability options 
Oi
P , 
(epochs not designated).  For example, the initial state for vehicle platform 
2
V  indicates that it starts 
with capability 
1
T .  The arcs connecting the states distinguish an initial set of actions, where 
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2
S = { , , }, , ,V VT VT VTT V T V TT .  Two decision rules are declared: i) 
1
V  can be changed to 
2
V , how-
ever, changing from 
2
V  to 
1
V  is not feasible; and ii) capabilities can only be added.  These rules 
prohibit the red dashed arcs.  Furthermore, the order of capability upgrades is restricted to 
1 2
,T T , 
resulting in the black lines being the only action choices.  For this example, three system-sets for 
which ( )iP V P   are identified (indicated by the bold black lines in Figure 4).  Calculations of cost 
and utility are then necessary to help select the preferred system-set. 
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FIGURE 4. SAMPLE ILLUSTRATION OF METHODOLOGY FOR THE CASE OF m = n = 2 
This research compares the respective costs of system-set alternatives that meet or exceed 
an identical set of requirements, but are set apart by different levels of RC.  Procurement cost is 
defined as the cost to procure a vehicle platform, or a subsystem associated with a capability up-
grade; change cost is defined as the cost required to increase the infrastructure (e.g. volume, power) 
of the system to the level necessary to receive an associated capability upgrade; and upgrade cost 
is defined as the cost associated with installing a capability upgrade.  Costs reflect the value at the 
time they are expected to be incurred. 
The relationship between costs, achieved capability, and RC is stated in the following for-
mula:  
 𝐶𝑇𝑌 = 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑇), 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑅𝐶 (𝑌)                               (1) 
where T = {1, 2,..., }n  and refers to technology capability upgrades, and Y = { , }A B  and refers to in-
itial RC.  Figure 5 illustrates equation (1) for a notional case where 3n  , and emphasizes the 
difference between change costs and upgrade costs.  Since system RC-A has limited RC, it requires 
an increase to its infrastructure (power, suspension) in order to receive a capability upgrade, and 
hence, change costs without any capability increase; system RC-B does not require change costs 
since it has sufficient RC to receive the upgrades.  It is conceivable that system RC-A may have 
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adequate RC for the initial upgrade, resulting in change costs later at 2n  .  For this illustration, 
it is assumed that the upgrade cost for a given capability upgrade is the same for both systems.  
Once the costs are established, the DM can determine which system-set is preferable. 
 
FIGURE 5. COSTS VS CAPABILITY FOR DIFFERENT LEVELS OF RESERVE CAPACITY 
Though the decision-driven change schedule specifies epochs for capability upgrades 
1
,
n n
E E

, they are for analysis and planning purposes and are not permanently set.  The framework 
will allow new or updated information, such as performance and burden data of capability options, 
to be inserted into the models at any time to determine if changes to the change schedule are war-
ranted. 
Utilizing initial costs, change schedule, and escalation factor, expected costs of the vehicle 
platforms and capability upgrades are calculated at the 5th through 95th percentiles, as well as the 
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minimum, maximum and mean.  For RO1 problems, our framework employs a decision tree4 to 
identify an optimal solution-set by using 95th percentile5 expected costs, along with 0-100 percent-
ages representing the effectiveness of each capability upgrade and dollar values representing con-
sequence if the capability upgrade is not effective.  Sensitivity analyses can also be conducted on 
the effectiveness and consequence variables to determine if variable uncertainty may alter the op-
timal solution-set.  This is identified in Figure 6 (Rhodes and Ross 2014) as “Performance vs 
Burdens Analysis,” essentially filtering out the less desirable system-sets based on cost-effective 
performance.   
For RO2 problems, the framework generates system-set alternatives using a combinatorial 
system trade-off6 model (CSTM) to assess multiple subsystems.  CSTM is a multi-criteria integer 
linear programming tool used to optimize the configuration of a whole system by selecting among 
multiple subsystem options.  This tool has validated capability of evaluating an expansive trade-
space far exceeding billions of potential system alternatives and producing a Pareto-set in a matter 
of minutes, so in no way will this research test its limits.  Each subsystem has an associated relative 
importance weight (RIW), performance score, cost and physical weight (burden).  CSTM evalu-
ates system configuration alternatives based on a set of competing measures: maximizing perfor-
mance criteria and minimizing burden criteria.  The output is a Pareto set of feasible and non-
dominated system alternatives; a two-dimensional example is provided in Figure 6, and Figure 7 
                                                     
 
4 See Ezell et al. (2010) for an explanation and examples of a decision tree. 
5 Although the mean or any percentile can be used, 95th was chosen to better ensure that worst-case cost 
estimates are included so as to minimize surprises for the customer. 
6 See Ahuja et al. (2007), and Collette and Siarry (2013) for combinatorial trade information and examples. 
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displays the same example in a three-dimensional view.  In Figure 6, “ovals” mark the “knee-
bends” where high-potential solutions can be found; for this example, solutions to the right of the 
ovals show comparable performance, but with increased cost. CSTM is identified in Figure 8 as 
the “Performance vs Burdens Model.”   
 
FIGURE 6. 2-D EXAMPLE OF PARETO SOLUTION SET PRODUCED BY THE CSTM 
 
FIGURE 7. 3-D EXAMPLE OF PARETO SOLUTION SET PRODUCED BY THE CSTM 
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After taking into consideration all completed analyses, an appropriate number of system-
set alternatives are selected for system-level analysis.  A multi-attribute utility (MAU)7 trade-off 
model, Logical Decisions® for Windows (LDW®), is used to identify the alternatives with the 
most utility from the decision-maker’s perspective.  LDW® is a decision support software for 
evaluating choices by way of quantifying preferences.  This is identified in Figure 8 as the “MAU 
model.”  Each evaluation criterion has a RIW, and each alternative is assessed against every crite-
rion (labeled a “measure” in LDW®), resulting in a total utility for each system-set alternative.  
Sensitivity analysis is performed on RIW to determine if any change to a criterion’s importance 
weighting results in a change to the overall alternative ranking.  Additionally, the MAU model 
allows direct comparison between any two alternatives to identify strengths and weakness; some-
times this capability can be used to generate hybrid alternatives based on existing strengths. 
 
FIGURE 8. FRAMEWORK DECISION LOOP 
                                                     
 
7 See Forman & Gass (2009) for an explanation of multi-attribute utility theory. 
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3.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The principal question that this research set out to address is “How can set-based design be 
enhanced and applied to the engineering of resilient systems?”  This question has two main ele-
ments: in what ways can SBD be improved, and how can each way be applied to the engineering 
of resilient systems?  There are three avenues for improving SBD that this research will address: 
enhancement, expansion, and extension. 
One avenue to address is how establishing a practical quantitative trade-space framework 
can enhance SBD.  This includes quantification that will enable DMs to express preferences across 
multiple attributes.  Will a preference or value-based approach produce different results compared 
to an approach based strictly on performance versus cost? 
A second avenue is how expansion of the trade-space can improve SBD.  Will a greater 
number of potential capability options provide more or better opportunities for engineering resili-
ent systems?  Also, can expansion be supported with a practical quantitative trade-space frame-
work? 
Lastly, can SBD be improved by extending its capability, to defer decisions beyond the 
design process until after a system is fielded, to explicitly carry a set of possible solutions past the 
point of the initial fielding of the system?  Furthermore, what is a realistic expectation for how 
long system resiliency can effectively enable easy and rapid capability upgrades in response to 
requirement changes?  30 years? 50 years?  Also, can extension be supported with a practical 
quantitative trade-space framework? 
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3.3. RESEARCH APPROACH 
In this research the case system is defined as a ground combat vehicle platform with three 
capabilities/subsystems: protection, lethality, and mobility; mobility is a support capability neces-
sary for propelling the vehicle platform with increased protection and lethality.  Fielded capabili-
ties influence the probability distribution of the adversary situations expected to be encountered. 
Adversary response is expected to exploit limitations and avoid strengths. In Figure 9, the perim-
eter notionally defines the capability limits of the vehicle platform for a given mission with respect 
to lethality and protection; if additional capability is required for a given mission, then a more 
capable system—one with increased lethality and/or protection—would be employed instead.  Mo-
bility could be considered in a third dimension to understand the relationship amongst the three 
parameters, e.g. increased weight from upgraded lethality or protection will degrade mobility. The 
performance envelope, representing current capabilities, displays two potential extremes of 
strength versus limitation, and how the adversary is expected to respond to each one. The adver-
sarial risk value (ARV), a product of associated ARA, is a function of the performance envelope 
relative to the capability limits. In an abstract sense, ARV represents the portion of the capability 
limits not met with the current capabilities; capability need is the additional capability necessary 
to diminish ARV.  As previously noted in Literature Review, it is not within the scope of this 
research to actually estimate ARV, but rather to merely understand its association with capability 
need. 
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FIGURE 9. SYSTEM PERFORMANCE ENVELOPE VS EXPECTED ADVERSARY RESPONSE 
For both the RO1 and RO2 design versions of the framework, two levels of armor protec-
tion {7.62mm (
1
T ) and 12.7mm (
3
T )} and one level of lethality {7.62mm (
2
T )} are identified as 
the capability needs.  Mobility options, based on levels of horsepower (HP) suitable for supporting 
each vehicle platform and all T that it can support ( ( )iV  ), have been identified.  Furthermore, 
times between 
n
E  and 
1n
E

are based on triangular distributions.  Though other distribution types 
could be used to estimate when necessary capability upgrades are to occur, triangular distribu-
tions—early case, most likely case, late case—are used due to their familiarity with most custom-
ers.  Table 1 displays the designated triangular distributions. 
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TABLE 1. TRIANGULAR DISTRIBUTIONS 
 
Evaluation criteria assess cost and performance: performance criteria includes physical-
data metrics for mobility and payload, while agility and flexibility are constructed metrics, defined 
respectively as follows: 
Agility 
 High = requires no more than 72 hours to perform all upgrades. 
 Med-High = requires at least 72 hours, but no more than 96 hours, to perform all upgrades.  
 Med = requires at least 96 hours, but no more than 144 hours, to perform all upgrades.  
 Med-Low = requires at least 144 hours, but no more than 168 hours, to perform all upgrades.  
 Low = requires more than 168 hours to perform all upgrades. 
Flexibility 
 High = requires no more than 2 people to perform all upgrades at unit location. 
 Med-High = requires up to 3 people to perform all upgrades at unit location. 
 Med = requires more than 3 people to perform all upgrades at unit location. 
 Med-Low = requires up to 2 people to perform all upgrades at multiple locations. 
 Low = requires more than 2 people to perform all upgrades at multiple locations. 
Units in 
Years 
E0  →  E1 E1  → E2 E2 →  E3 
AP 
 7.62mm 
(T1) 
Lethality 
7.62mm 
(T2) 
AP  
12.7mm 
(T3) 
Early Case 1.7 4.0 8.1 
Most Likely 2.4 4.9 9.3 
Late Case 2.9 5.5 10.1 
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For brevity, no lifecycle costs other than those defined in Section 3.1 are included.  All 
evaluated technologies are assumed to have achieved a technology readiness level (TRL)8 of at 
least seven (Katz et al. 2014), to eliminate technology development costs as well as the associated 
risk.  In estimating cost parameters, data available from multiple open sources was used.  While 
these cost parameters are expected to accurately reflect actual costs, for the purpose of the study 
their validity was verified with subject matter experts.  Furthermore, the scoring for alternatives 
and options with respect to decision criteria are estimates and, though considered realistic, should 
be regarded to serve the demonstrative purpose of the developed framework. 
3.4. ANALYSIS VEHICLE 
The High-Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), commonly referred to as 
the Humvee, was originally designed and built by AM General in 1985 as a personnel and light 
cargo transport, replacing multiple vehicles such as the M151 Military Utility Tactical Truck 
(MUTT), M561 Gama Goat, and M274 Mechanical Mule (Green 2005).  The baseline HMMWV 
(M998A0) had no armor protection and no lethality other than personal weapons carried by its 
passengers.  During the next 10 years, the HMMWV was pressed into service in multiple new 
missions, with emphasis on urban combat roles, for which it was not originally intended.  As 
weapons and an armored cupola were added, it raised the center of gravity and increased the pro-
pensity to roll-over, a very serious problem and cause of loss of life.  There was no performance 
envelope for changes in the center of gravity (CG), no requirement for how much the CG could 
                                                     
 
8  Technology Readiness Levels is a nine-level ordinal scale for measuring the technology maturity of system 
and subsystems (Katz et al. 2014). 
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shift without causing roll-over in the reference conditions.  Similarly, when protection was neces-
sarily increased, mobility was critically degraded because the mobility package (powertrain, sus-
pension and steering) did not have adequate RC to handle the increased weight and angular inertia 
of additional armor (Boehm 2016).  Although the greatly improved M998A2, fielded in 1995, had 
an additional 10 horsepower (160 vs 150, via turbocharger) and 1,950 pounds payload over the 
baseline model, its durability and reliability suffered significantly.  That same year, AM General 
also began producing the M1113 expanded capacity variant; it offered 190hp and additional pay-
load of 650 pounds compared to the M998A2, allowing the required lethality and armor protection 
while maintaining adequate mobility (Green 2005). 
The HMMWV has been criticized in recent years for its inability to repel all adversary 
attacks.  However, for its basic purpose as a four-wheel drive, cargo carrier, it has been quite 
versatile at performing its original mission in nearly every operational environment and weather 
condition encountered by U.S. forces since 1985 (Goerger et al. 2014). 
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 1 
For the first of two objectives, an analytic framework is established to evaluate existing 
systems and capability need technology to identify system-set alternatives that meet critical re-
quirements.  The framework addresses the amount of RC necessary for a resilient system with 
cost-effective capability growth to accommodate associated upgrades loosely scheduled against 
an inexact timetable. 
4.1. RO1 SETUP 
Three existing vehicle platforms, designated 
1 2 3
V = { , , }V V V , are identified as the options.  
3
V  has integral 7.62mm AP and weapon capabilities, so 
3 1,2
{ , }V P ; therefore, there are no associated
1 2
,E E  upgrade costs.  Also, three decision rules are declared: i) the order of vehicle platform up-
grades must be 
1 2 3
, ,V V V ; ii) capability options can only be added; and iii) the order of capability 
upgrades must be 
1 2 3
, ,T T T .  Figure 10 displays the RO1 model, where 2m n  , 
1 1 2 1 2 3
{ , , , }P T TT TT T

  , and 
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
S = { , , }, , , , , ,V VT VTT V V T V TT V TT T V TT V TT T .  There are 14 solu-
tion-sets that achieve all requirements; 
1 1,2,3
{ , }V P  is infeasible as 
1
V  lacks sufficient RC to receive 
3
T , and 
3 1,2
{ , }V P  does not change until 
3
E , thus the dashed arcs between 
0
E  and 
2
E .  Table 2 lists 
the data defining the necessary characteristics of the vehicle platforms and required capabilities. 
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FIGURE 10. RO1 SOLUTION-SETS THAT ACHIEVE ALL REQUIREMENTS 
 
TABLE 2. RO1 VEHICLE PLATFORMS / CAPABILITIES CHARACTERIZATION DATA 
 
Vehicles Initial Cost
Weight 
(lbs)
Payload 
(lbs)
HP
V 1 , P ∅ ($48,000) 5,900 4,450 160
V 2 , P ∅ ($102,000) 6,400 5,100 190
V 2 , P 1 ($121,300) 8,500 3,000 190
V 2 , P 1,2 ($156,400) 8,935 2,565 190
V 2 , P 1,2,3 ($194,300) 10,835 665 190
V 3 , P 1,2 ($433,500) 16,000 4,000 325
V 3 , P 1,2,3 ($476,100) 18,700 1,300 325
Capability
Options
Initial Cost
Weight 
(lbs)
T 1  (V 1 ) ($17,800) 2,000
T 1  (V 2 ) ($19,300) 2,100
T 2  (V 1 ) ($33,400) 400
T 2  (V 2 ) ($35,100) 435
T 3  (V 2 ) ($37,900) 1,900
T 3  (V 3 ) ($42,600) 2,700
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4.2. RO1 RESULTS 
Based on initial (
0
E ) costs alone (from Table 2, with no escalation factor), the total costs 
of all 14 system-sets are displayed in ranked order (least to most) in Table 3 (Total Cost equals 
sum of 
0 3
E E  costs per system-set).  This represents the hypothetical case where all vehicle plat-
form / capability upgrades are procured at 
0
E . 
TABLE 3. RANKING OF RO1 SYSTEM-SETS BASED ON E0 TOTAL COST 
 
Using the “most likely” values from Table 1 (2.4, 4.9 and 9.3 years) for 
1 2 3
, ,E E E , and an 
escalation factor to reflect the time-value of costs, the system-set total costs were recalculated.  At 
0% escalation, the revised system-set ranking matched the Table 3 ranking.  Sensitivity analysis 
was conducted on the escalation factor, ranging from 0% to 20%, to determine if any increase 
would impact the ranking.  Figure 11 illustrates the escalation factor sensitivity of all 14 system-
sets for the “most likely” epoch scenario.  No changes to the top six ranked (lowest cost) system-
sets were observed until the escalation factor reached 8.2% for the “most likely” epoch scenario, 
System-
Set #
E 0 Cost E 1 To Cost E 2 To Cost E 3 To Cost
10 V2 $102,000 U T1 $19,300 U T2 $35,100 U T3 $37,900 $194,300
6 V1 $48,000 R V2 $121,300 U T2 $35,100 U T3 $37,900 $242,300
3 V1 $48,000 U T1 $17,800 R V2 $156,400 U T3 $37,900 $260,100
1 V1 $48,000 U T1 $17,800 U T2 $33,400 R V2 $194,300 $293,500
14 V3 $433,500 X V3 $0 X V3 $0 U T3 $42,600 $476,100
9 V1 $48,000 R V3 $433,500 X V3 $0 U T3 $42,600 $524,100
5 V1 $48,000 U T1 $17,800 R V3 $433,500 U T3 $42,600 $541,900
2 V1 $48,000 U T1 $17,800 U T2 $33,400 R V3 $476,100 $575,300
13 V2 $102,000 R V3 $433,500 X V3 $0 U T3 $42,600 $578,100
12 V2 $102,000 U T1 $19,300 R V3 $433,500 U T3 $42,600 $597,400
11 V2 $102,000 U T1 $19,300 U T2 $35,100 R V3 $476,100 $632,500
8 V1 $48,000 R V2 $121,300 R V3 $433,500 U T3 $42,600 $645,400
7 V1 $48,000 R V2 $121,300 U T2 $35,100 R V3 $476,100 $680,500
4 V1 $48,000 U T1 $17,800 R V2 $156,400 R V3 $476,100 $698,300
U = Upgrade; R = Replacement; X = No Change
TOTAL
COST   
30 
 
where system-sets #1 and #14 exchanges positions.  For the remaining system-sets, several rank 
changes occur prior to the escalation factor reaching 5%.  
 
FIGURE 11. RO1 ESCALATION FACTOR SENSITIVITY FOR MOST LIKELY EPOCH SCENARIO 
Quick examination of Figure 11 reveals that system-sets #2, #4, #7 and #11 have the steep-
est incline in total cost.  Table 3 reveals that each of those system-sets call for the most costly 
action, replacing 
1
V  or 
2
V  with 
3
V , at
3
E , the most costly time.  System-set #1 exhibits the second-
most steepest incline in total cost, with its most costly action, replacing 
1
V with 
2
V , also at
3
E , the 
most costly time.  In contrast, #14 requires its most costly action, the initial procurement of 
3
V , at 
0
E  when the escalation factor has no impact, therefore explaining its relatively flat cost slope.  
Figure 12 provides a closer look, along with cost values for the eight lowest-cost system sets, at 
the same sensitivity graph to better examine the crossover points. 
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FIGURE 12. RO1 ESCALATION SENSITIVITY FOR MOST LIKELY EPOCH SCENARIO (CLOSE-IN) 
Escalation sensitivity was also performed using the “early” case and “late” case epoch sce-
nario values (triangular distributions) from Table 1.  No changes to the top six ranked system-sets 
were observed until the escalation factor reached 9.6% for the “early” case, and 7.5% for the “late” 
case.  As with the “most likely” case, the 4th and 5th-ranked system-sets (#1 and #14, respectively) 
exchanged positions.   
At this point, Monte-Carlo simulation was used to generate expected cost distributions 
based on initial (
0
E ) costs, the “most likely” epoch scenario for capability upgrades, and an esca-
lation factor (nominal) triangular distribution of 0% (best case), 8% (most likely), and 20% (worst 
case).  Table 4 displays the system-set ranking based on associated 95% total expected cost.  The 
correlation coefficient (Spearman’s rho) between this ranking and the Table 3 ranking is 0.921, 
indicating strong positive correlation. 
32 
 
TABLE 4. SYSTEM-SET RANKING BASED ON FIRST CALCULATION OF 95% ETC 
 
Additionally, Monte-Carlo simulation was used to generate expected cost distributions 
based on initial (
0
E ) costs, all triangular distributions for capability upgrades (Table 1), and the 
same escalation factor triangular distribution used previously.  Table 5 displays the system-set 
ranking based on associated 95% total expected cost, which is identical to the Table 4 ranking, or 
a correlation coefficient of 1.0.   
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TABLE 5. SYSTEM-SET RANKING BASED ON SECOND CALCULATION OF 95% ETC 
 
Based on expected total cost, system-set #10 consistently is the top-ranked alternative.  De-
cision tree analysis also identified system-set #10 as the optimal choice; sensitivity analyses re-
sulted in no change.  Based on the performed analyses, the lowest-cost system-set for each of five 
categories, beginning with 
1 2
,V V or 
3
V  and finishing with 
2
V  or 
3
V , was chosen for system-level 
analysis; those five selected system-sets are #6, #9, #10, #13, and #14.  Additionally, system-sets 
#1 and #3 were selected since they always ranked in the top seven overall.  Although all 14 system-
sets could move forward into system-level analysis, seven were selected to make it easier to focus 
on a smaller alternative set. 
For the system-set analysis, Figure 13 displays the Goals Hierarchy from the MAU model, 
listing each criterion along with its respective RWI.  The input data for the MAU model, along 
with the RIW for each criterion, are provided in Table 6.  Cost data are entered as three-point 
distributions using respective 5%, 50% and 95% values derived from the earlier second Monte 
34 
 
Carlo simulation; the mean values are shown in Table 6.  Agility and Flexibility are estimated from 
the constructed scale defined in paragraph 3.3.  Mobility and Payload data are derived from Table 
2 (Mobility = HP/(Weight/2000); Payload reflects a weight RC by measuring how much payload 
is available for additional cargo. 
 
FIGURE 13. RO1 GOALS HIERARCHY FROM THE MAU MODEL 
TABLE 6. INPUT DATA FOR RO1 SYSTEM-SET ANALYSIS 
 
Stacked-bar rankings of the system-sets, based on total utility, are displayed in Figure 13.  
Each colored segment of a stacked-bar represents the utility associated with the same-colored cri-
terion for the respective alternative (the longer the segment, the greater the utility).  Uncertainty 
Cost ($)
 0.500
Cost
 0.500
Agility
 0.150
Flexibility
 0.150
Changeability
 0.300
Mobility
 0.125
Payload (tons)
 0.075
Performance
 0.500
RO1 Selection
 1.000
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markings at the right end of each stacked-bar reflect the cost distribution.  RIW sensitivity analysis 
reveals a moderately robust model; see Figures 23-27 in Appendix C for a sensitivity graph for 
each criterion (labeled “measure” in LDW®).  Cost, Agility, and Payload are the only criteria that 
exhibit any sensitivity, and the sensitivity for each is judged to be moderate (delta of 7–11 per-
centage points).  In order to produce a change in ranking, the Cost RIW would have to be decreased 
from 50% to 39.8%, or the Agility RIW would have to be increased from 15% to 24.8%, or the 
Payload RIW would have to be increased from 7.5% to 14.7%.  In each situation, the top- ranked 
system-set 10 and 2nd-ranked system-set 14 would switch positions.  For this problem, regardless 
of any modification to the RIWs, the preferred alternatives are the two system-sets that do not 
require a change of vehicle platform for any capability upgrade (#10 and #14).  
 
FIGURE 14. RANKING OF RO1 SYSTEM-SETS BASED ON TOTAL UTILITY 
Additionally,  Figure 15 illustrates the direct comparison of strengths and weaknesses be-
tween the two top-ranked alternatives: top-ranked #10 is superior with respect to (wrt) Cost and 
Mobility, while second-ranked #14 is superior wrt Agility and Payload, but to a lesser degree than 
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#10’s Cost dominance.  See Figures 28-29 in Appendix C for additional comparisons of the three 
top-ranked alternatives. 
 
FIGURE 15. COMPARISON BETWEEN RO1 #1 AND #2 RANKED SOLUTION-SETS  
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Another way to directly compare multiple alternatives is with the MAU tool’s scatter dia-
gram capability.  In Figure 16, all seven system-sets are compared wrt Cost vs Mobility vs Payload 
criteria, though any three criteria can be selected.  By referring to Table 3, it can be determined 
that system-sets #1, #3, #6 and #10, represented by the small circles, all finish with vehicle plat-
form 
2
V .  Likewise, it can be determined that the three system-sets represented by the large circles, 
all finish with vehicle platform 
3
V .  From this chart, it can be concluded that in order to increase 
Payload in the top-ranked system-set alternative (#10), with minimal Mobility degradation, #14 
would have to be the selected system-set, with the associated cost increase.  As previously stated, 
increasing the RIW for the Payload criterion from 7.5% to 14.7% would also result in #14 becom-
ing the top-ranked system-set. 
 
FIGURE 16. SCATTER DIAGRAM COMPARING ALL RO1 SOLUTION-SETS  
Scatter Diagram for NEW PREF. SET Preference Set
886163
201402
31.3 38.6
Cost ($)
(USD)
Mobility (HP/Tons)
 0.200
 0.400
 0.600
 0.800
System-Set #10
System-Set #14
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System-Set #09
System-Set #13
System-Set #01
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Preference Set = NEW REF. SET
38 
 
CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 2 
For the second research objective, the RO1 framework is expanded to new system devel-
opment for engineering resilient systems that will facilitate flexible, agile, and cost-effective ca-
pability growth in response to uncertain future needs.  The production design is evaluated in com-
bination with its affordable set of future upgrade options within the SBD paradigm, keeping the 
potential for future options open by focusing on RC and balancing average unit production cost 
against change and upgrade costs. 
5.1. RO2 SETUP 
Instead of designated vehicle platforms, there are now four hull configuration options 
1 2 3 4
H = { , , , }H H H H , and five mobility options 
1 2 3 4 5
M = { , , , , }M M M M M ; the capability needs remain 
the same as earlier defined 
1 2 3
{ , , }T T T .  Table 7 displays the input data for the RO2 combinatorial 
trade-study model.  It includes the subsystem options considered for this problem, along with re-
spective RIWs and performance scores, physical weights, and costs.  RIWs are usually agreed 
upon by stakeholders, but for this research they are set equally for all subsystems.  Performance 
scores generally reflect how well the option meets its associated requirements; for this research 
the scores are simply estimates based on 0.50 meeting a minimum requirement and 1.00 meeting 
a maximum requirement.  For other than hull configuration, the subsystem options are identified 
by full nomenclature so they can be quickly recognized. 
The hull configuration includes all other subsystems in the vehicle platform not listed in 
Table 7.  
1
H  has minimum volume necessary to accommodate those subsystems not listed; options 
1 1
( )H E , 
1 2
( )H E , and 
1 3
( )H E  represent option 
1
H  extended to a size equivalent with option 
2
H . 
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TABLE 7. INPUT DATA FOR RO2 PERFORMANCE VS BURDENS MODEL 
 
Mobility (in horsepower, hp) includes the engine, transmission, and suspension; 
1 2 3 4 5
, , , ,M M M M M   
represent 160, 210, 230, 260, 300 hp, and most of the options represent upgrades from one measure 
of hp to the next-higher hp.  For Protection-1 subsystem (
1
T ), 
3
H  and 
4
H  come with integral ca-
pability; the listed options map to 
1
H  and 
2
H .  Lethality/Armament subsystem (
2
T ) has two options: 
Basic maps to 
1
H  and 
2
H , and Premium maps to 
3
H  and 
4
H .  Protection-2 subsystem (
3
T ), has 
Burden Burden Burden Burden
Max 
Weight 
(lbs)
Expected 
Cost
 (USD)
Max 
Weight 
(lbs)
Expected 
Cost
 (USD)
Hull Configuration 20.0% Protection-1 20.0%
H1 0.50 3,644 $82,500 7.62mm H1 (E0) 1.00 2,000 $18,381
H1(E1) 0.80 4,505 $154,272 7.62mm H1 (E1) 1.00 2,000 $24,341
H1(E2) 0.80 4,505 $201,808 7.62mm H1 (E2) 1.00 2,000 $31,841
H1(E3) 0.80 4,505 $375,845 7.62mm H1 (E3) 1.00 2,000 $59,300
H2 0.80 4,505 $102,000 7.62mm H2 (E0) 1.00 2,100 $19,300
H3 0.90 6,750 $143,575 7.62mm H2 (E1) 1.00 2,100 $25,558
H4 1.00 8,850 $187,272 7.62mm H2 (E2) 1.00 2,100 $33,433
Mobility 20.0% 7.62mm H2 (E3) 1.00 2,100 $62,264
M160 (E0) 0.25 2,856 $23,700 7.62mm H3H4 1.00 0 $0
M160-210 (E1) 0.50 2,931 $40,257 Protection-2 20.0%
M160-210 (E2) 0.50 2,931 $52,661 12.7mm H1 (E0) 0.75 1,435 $28,624
M160-210 (E3) 0.50 2,931 $98,074 12.7mm H1 (E1) 0.75 1,435 $37,905
M210 (E0) 0.50 4,320 $29,276 12.7mm H1 (E2) 0.75 1,435 $49,584
M210-230 (E1) 0.65 4,395 $48,038 12.7mm H1 (E3) 0.75 1,435 $92,345
M210-230 (E2) 0.65 4,395 $62,840 12.7mm H2 (E0) 1.00 1,900 $37,900
M210-230 (E3) 0.65 4,395 $117,031 12.7mm H2 (E1) 1.00 1,900 $50,189
M230 (E0) 0.65 4,395 $36,276 12.7mm H2 (E2) 1.00 1,900 $65,653
M260 (E0) 0.75 6,000 $36,246 12.7mm H2 (E3) 1.00 1,900 $122,270
M260-300 (E1) 1.00 6,150 $59,255 12.7mm H3 (E0) 1.00 2,350 $46,876
M260-300 (E2) 1.00 6,150 $77,512 12.7mm H3 (E1) 1.00 2,350 $64,274
M260-300 (E3) 1.00 6,150 $144,357 12.7mm H3 (E2) 1.00 2,350 $84,666
M300 (E0) 1.00 6,150 $44,746 12.7mm H3 (E3) 1.00 2,350 $157,680
Lethality / Armament 20.0% 12.7mm H4 (E0) 1.00 2,700 $53,858
7.62mm Basic (E0) 0.70 265 $12,600 12.7mm H4 (E1) 1.00 2,700 $71,321
7.62mm Basic (E1) 0.70 265 $16,685 12.7mm H4 (E2) 1.00 2,700 $93,297
7.62mm Basic (E2) 0.70 265 $21,827 12.7mm H4 (E3) 1.00 2,700 $173,753
7.62mm Basic (E3) 0.70 265 $40,649
7.62mm Premium (E0) 1.00 635 $33,500
7.62mm Premium (E1) 1.00 635 $44,362
7.62mm Premium (E2) 1.00 635 $58,031
7.62mm Premium (E3) 1.00 635 $108,075
Subsystems/
Options
Performance
Score
and RIW
Subsystems/ 
Options
Performance
Score
and RIW
40 
 
options mapped to each of the four hull configuration options.  All options designated by 
1 2
,E E  or 
3
E  in their name are priced for their corresponding epoch using 95th percentile expected costs.  As 
with RO1, expected costs are based on the triangular distributions shown in Table 1.  The one 
decision rule for RO2 is that capability options can only be added.  Of the remaining RO1 decision 
rules, dictating the order of vehicle platform upgrades is no longer applicable since the objective 
of RO2 development is to avoid changing vehicle platforms, and the order of capability upgrades 
is eliminated since any order or combination of capability upgrades is allowed through allocating 
adequate RC for each of the hull configuration options.  Based on the subsystem/capability options 
listed in Table 7, along with the associated interoperability/compatibility constraints, the trade-
space for this problem consists of approximately 1,552 system-set alternatives. 
5.2. RO2 RESULTS 
Figure 17 displays all Pareto (non-dominated) system-set solutions produced by the com-
binatorial model (system-set numbers were assigned by the model), ranked by the multi-utility 
function (MUF) score, which is the performance metric.  Since only seven solutions were identi-
fied, the CSTM two and three-dimensional viewing capability was not necessary for selecting so-
lutions for system-level analysis; all seven were carried forward.  Note that highlighted system-set 
1674 is the only solution that includes a change to the hull configuration, and it is at the earliest 
and least costly epoch 
1
E .  Although option 
1 1
( )H E  calls for extending 
1
H  at 
1
E , 
1
H  has sufficient 
payload (weight RC) to receive Protection-1 and Lethality capability upgrades.  However, it won’t 
be able to receive the added weight of Protection-2 capability upgrade before 
1
E .  Therefore, the 
highlighted Protection-2 option was changed from 
2 0
( )H E  to 
2 1
( )H E , resulting in a cost increase 
of $12,289.   
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FIGURE 17. RO2 PARETO SYSTEM-SETS FROM PERFORMANCE VS BURDENS MODEL 
Figure 18 models the identified RO2 solution-sets.  Note that six of the seven system-sets 
call for adding the capability options at the earliest point possible.  This is not surprising since it’s 
based on the earliest costs being the lowest.  All capability options don’t have to be incorporated 
at 
0
E , but the fact that they can be is a significant advantage to the DM.  Moreover, the key point 
is that RC is the attribute that enabled that advantage.  The next step determined how much utility 
is coupled with that RC. 
 
FIGURE 18. RO2 SYSTEM-SETS THAT ACHIEVE ALL REQUIREMENTS 
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For RO2, three decision criteria were added: Power RC, Required Capability Met, and 
Volume RC; Figure 19 displays the RO2 Goals Hierarchy.  Calculations for Power RC and Volume 
RC, along with Payload, are highlighted in Table 8.  Required Cap (Capability) Met is the respec-
tive MUF value from Figure 17.  Power RC is the difference between the alternative’s assigned 
level of horsepower and the horsepower required at the alternative’s curb weight.  Volume RC is 
the percentage difference between the volume of the alternative and the volume of alternative 
#1673.  All input data for the RO2 MAU system model, along with the RIW for each criterion, are 
provided in Table 9.   
 
FIGURE 19. RO2 GOALS HIERARCHY FROM THE MAU MODEL 
Cost ($)
 0.125
Cost
 0.125
Agility
 0.125
Flexibility
 0.125
Changeability
 0.250
Mobility (HP/tons)
 0.125
Required Cap Met (%)
 0.125
Payload (lbs)
 0.125
Power RC
 0.125
Volume RC
 0.125
Reserve Capacity
 0.375
Performance
 0.875
RO2 Selection
 1.000
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TABLE 8. DATA CALCULATIONS FOR RO2 POWER RC, PAYLOAD & VOLUME RC 
 
TABLE 9. INPUT DATA FOR RO2 SYSTEM-SET ANALYSIS 
 
Resulting stacked-bar rankings of the system-set alternatives, based on total utility, are 
displayed in Figure 20.  Since the costs are not represented by a distribution, there are no uncer-
tainty markings as in Figure 14.  
Criterion Agility Cost ($) Flexibility
Mobility 
(HP/tons)
Payload 
(lbs)
Power 
RC
Required 
Cap Met (%)
Volume 
RC
RIW 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125
System-Set 
Alternative
#1671 H2 High 203076 Med-High 34.9 1235 0.77 0.86 0.06
#1672 H2 High 201076 Med-High 32.1 1310 0.62 0.83 0.06
#1673 H1 High 165805 Med-High 31.4 0 0.60 0.67 0.00
#1674 H1 (E1) Med-Low 276618 Low 35.9 2699 0.62 0.83 0.06
#1675 H3 Med-High 263697 Medium 37.8 1765 0.58 0.99 0.44
#1676 H3 Med-High 260197 Medium 33.0 1915 0.37 0.94 0.44
#1677 H4 Med-High 314376 Medium 32.7 1665 0.36 1.00 1.04
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FIGURE 20. RANKING OF RO2 SYSTEM-SETS BASED ON TOTAL UTILITY 
RIW sensitivity analysis reveals an overall robust model; see Figures 30-37 in Appendix 
D for a sensitivity graph for each criterion (labeled “measure” in LDW®).  Agility and Flexibility 
exhibit no sensitivity, indicating that no change to either criterion’s RIW would result in a change 
in the top-ranked alternative.  Any one of the changes listed in Table 10 would result in the respec-
tive change of the top-ranked alternative.  Each of the criteria in Table 10 exhibit low sensitivity 
with respect to RIW.  
TABLE 10. RIW SENSITIVITY FOR RO2 CRITERIA 
 
Criterion
RIW Change Req'd to Change 
Top-Ranked Alternative
New Top-Ranked 
Alternative
Cost > 47.4% #1673 H1
Mobility > 29.1% #1675 H3
Payload > 29.6% #1675 H3
Power RC < 0.7% #1675 H3
Req'd Cap Met > 34.4% #1675 H3
Volume RC > 22.1% #1677 H4
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Additionally, the MAU model allows direct comparison between any two alternatives to 
identify strengths and weakness.   Figure 21 illustrates the comparison between the two top-ranked 
alternatives: top-ranked #1671 is superior with respect to (wrt) Power RC, Cost, Flexibility, and 
Agility; second-ranked #1675 is superior wrt Volume RC, Mobility, Payload, and Required Capa-
bility Met.  See Figures 38-39 in Appendix D for additional comparisons of the three top-ranked 
alternatives.  
 
FIGURE 21. COMPARISON BETWEEN RO2 #1 AND #2 RANKED SYSTEM-SETS 
As demonstrated for RO1, the MAU tool’s scatter diagram capability is a way to directly 
compare multiple alternatives.  In Figure 22, all seven system-sets are compared wrt Cost vs Mo-
bility vs Payload criteria, though any three criteria can be selected.  By referring to Table 8 or 9, it 
can be determined that each of the four circle sizes corresponds to one of the four hull configuration 
options.  From this chart, it can be concluded that in order to increase Payload in the top-ranked 
system-set alternative (#1671), without degrading Mobility, #1675 would have to be the selected 
system-set, with the associated cost increase.  As illustrated in Table 10, increasing the RIW for 
the Mobility, Payload, Power RC, or Req’d Cap Met criterion by the corresponding amount listed, 
RO2 Selection Goal Utility for System-Set #1671
System-Set #1675
Total Difference
 0.653
 0.609
 0.044
Total Difference
Power RC
Volume RC
Cost ($)
Flexibility
Agility
Mobility (HP/tons)
Payload (lbs)
Required Cap Met (%)
Difference
 0.044
 0.046
-0.042
 0.039
 0.031
 0.031
-0.023
-0.022
-0.016
System-Set #1675 System-Set #1671
Preference Set = NEW PREF. SET
46 
 
would also result in #1675 becoming the top-ranked system-set.  Note that this relationship is 
comparable to the one observed in RO1. 
 
FIGURE 22. SCATTER DIAGRAM COMPARING ALL RO2 SYSTEM-SETS 
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CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY, ANSWERS AND FUTURE RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES 
6.1. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH OBJECTIVES RESULTS 
Considering the results from RO1 and RO2 in context of the three-way relationship illus-
trated in Figure 5, it can be said that multiple solution-sets were assessed that achieved identical 
system capability need though they varied in costs due to different amounts of RC.  Although RC 
increases system cost by growing the system platform, the associated utility reveals that the addi-
tional cost may be worth the benefits.  In both RO1 and RO2 scenarios, the preferred solution-sets 
were those that did not include a change of/to the initial vehicle platform: #10 and #14 in RO1, 
and the six of the top seven Pareto system-sets in RO2.  This outcome illustrates the advantage of 
having sufficient RC as early as is feasible in the system life cycle to minimize change costs and 
increase system changeability. 
Moreover, though less-costly solution-sets may be initially preferred based on cost alone 
(#10 in RO1), after other important decision criteria are integrated into the study and assessed from 
a utility perspective, even the most costly alternatives may became competitive.  In RO1, #10 
dominated all other alternatives with respect to cost.  However, once the other decision criteria 
were included, an alternative that cost more than twice the dominant low-cost solution-set became 
a contender.  Likewise to a smaller degree, in RO2 an increase of 9.6 percentage points for the 
Volume RC RIW, which is not wholly unreasonable, would result in the highest-cost alternative 
(#1677) becoming the top-ranked system-set. 
In multiple ways the resulting framework provides enhanced insight into the trade-space.  
The CSTM viewing capability facilitates identification and selection of strong-potential solutions 
for system-level analysis.  For system-level analysis, the MAU tool, LDW®, allows the DMs and 
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stakeholders to immediately view how “what-if” excursions of adjusting criteria RIW impact the 
ranking, and to better understand the relationship among multiple  criteria. 
6.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS ANSWERED 
The principal question that this research set out to address is “How can set-based design be 
enhanced and applied to the engineering of resilient systems?”  The three avenues for improving 
SBD that this research addressed are enhancement, expansion, and extension. 
First, SBD was enhanced by establishing a practical quantitative trade-space framework 
that provides the opportunity for quantifying changeability, by means of flexibility and agility, and 
using associated metrics to evaluate the relationship between RC and changeability.  For this re-
search, simple metrics were defined for flexibility and agility; however, the opportunity exists for 
more comprehensive and informative ways to define and quantify those attributes.  Additionally, 
the framework enhanced SBD by allowing DMs to express preferences for all alternatives with 
respect to each criterion, thus improving the quality of information needed in determining which 
solution-set delivers the most utility.  For this research, the preference or value-based approach 
produced (in RO1), or demonstrated potential to produce (in RO2), a different ranking of system-
set alternatives compared to the ranking from an approach based strictly on performance versus 
cost. 
Second, SBD was expanded by establishing a practical quantitative trade-space framework 
that is capable of evaluating an expansive trade-space on-the-fly, allowing for a much greater num-
ber of subsystems to be included in a study, which is expected to result in more and better oppor-
tunities for engineering resilient systems.  For this research, capability need was constrained to 
two levels of armor protection and one level of lethality, resulting in a very limited trade-space 
that demonstrated only a minute fraction of the CSTM tool’s full capability. 
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Lastly, SBD was extended by establishing a practical quantitative trade-space framework 
that explicitly carries a set of possible system solutions past the point of the initial fielding of the 
system by considering changeability, as enabled through designed-in RC to accommodate addi-
tional volume, weight, power, cooling, and computing.  Though RC facilitates changeability, it is 
recognized that more RC is not necessarily always better.  The objective is to identify a balanced 
RC that provides an optimal degree of changeability, resulting in a more resilient yet cost-effective 
system that is able to easily and rapidly accept necessary improved capabilities.  
6.3. FUTURE RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES 
An opportunity for future research is to expand the trade-space by including technology 
options that are still being developed and show potential for being superior to current options.  This 
would further expand SBD by potentially providing more capability options that are technically 
superior, permitting more and better choices for the DM.  Moreover, this would likely extend the 
trade-space to cover a longer operational period that better aligns with the system’s design service 
life. 
Another stream of research could explore dealing with intelligent adaptive adversaries, and 
within that context, identifying capability need and examining how system-sets can be assessed 
for system resiliency with respect to multiple adversary responsive moves.  
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APPENDIX A: REAL-WORLD EXAMPLES OF LONG-LIVED SYSTEMS THAT HAVE 
UNDERGONE UNPLANNED UPGRADES 
The following are just a few examples of the many long-lived major military systems that 
have undergone multiple unplanned capability upgrades. 
1. C-130. The U.S. primary tactical airlift aircraft is the C-130 Hercules, used by the Air Force, 
Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard; over 40 variants/versions operate in more than 60 na-
tions.  The C-130 Hercules is the longest continuously produced military aircraft at over 60 
years.  Older model C-130s currently make up a significant portion of the entire fleet and are 
the focus of modernization issues.  The age of the fleet has created parts and avionics obso-
lescence issues, along with structural fatigue, that may impact the overall capability of the 
aircraft in the future.  The C-130A joined the Air Force inventory in December 1956.  Cur-
rently, the C-130H and C-130J are the most common models in the Air Force inventory.  As 
of 2014, the average age of the Air Force C-130H active fleet was 39 years; 75% of the avi-
onic pieces-parts will be considered to be obsolete by FY2023.  Diminishing Manufacturing 
Sources (DMS) is a significant issue for the C-130H fleet, primarily because the C-130H has 
old and outdated avionics; 22% of the avionics are already obsolete according to the Air 
Force Life Cycle Management Center.   This was magnified by the decision to cancel the C-
130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP), which was originally planned to address DMS 
issues within the fleet.  Assuming current international/U.S. regulations for aircraft Commu-
nication Navigation Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) requirements follow 
current implementation timelines, a significant portion of the C-130 fleet may be restricted 
access to certain European airspace as early as 2017.  The current fleet of C-130H models do 
not have the required avionics capabilities anticipated in certain U.S. airspace and in areas 
surrounding busy U.S. airports as soon as 2020.  With ongoing capability upgrades to bring 
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the C-130J fleet (the model still in production) into compliance with currently forecasted avi-
ation regulations, its service life will extend to 2040.  Another major modification currently 
being accomplished on the C-130 fleet to extend the service life is the replacement of the 
center wing box, a critical fatigue component of the C-130 fleet due to the stresses of flying 
missions over such a long period of time. (Heisler 2014.) 
2. M113 Armored Personnel Carrier.  The U.S Army’s M113 first entered service in 1960; 
major vehicle upgrades occurred in 1964 (M113A1), 1979 (M113A2), and 1987 (M113A3).  
Each upgrade consisted of new or improved engines and transmissions, and other changes 
included an overhauled suspension subsystem, optional external fuel-tanks, and armor pro-
tection.  Most recently, under the Armored Personnel Carrier Life Extension (APCLE) pro-
gram, 341 Canadian M113A2 series vehicles were upgraded: 183 were stretched and fitted 
with six road wheels, while the remaining 158 vehicles were upgraded to M113A3 standards, 
retaining five road wheels.  The U.S. Army stopped buying M113s in 2007, with 6,000 vehi-
cles remaining in the inventory.  The U.S. Army planned to retire the M113 family of vehi-
cles by 2018, seeking replacement with the GCV Infantry Fighting Vehicle program.  But 
since the GCV program was cancelled in 2014, the replacement of the M113 has fallen to the 
Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) program.  However, fielding of the AMPV is not 
scheduled until 2022.  [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M113_armored_personnel_carrier] 
3. Stryker. First fielded in 2002 and based on already-existing vehicle platforms, the U.S. 
Army’s Stryker ground combat vehicle was originally named the Interim Armored Vehicle 
and scheduled to be replaced by the products of the Future Combat System (FCS) Program.  
When the FCS Program was cancelled in 2009, the service life of the Stryker immediately 
became extended indefinitely.  Most of the Stryker’s upgrades have been in response to the 
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evolving threat.  In 2004, a slat-armor cage was installed on the vehicles as an intermediary 
protection against rocket-propelled grenades.  In 2010, major unplanned improvements cen-
tered on modifying the vehicle hull to a double-V design to protect against improvised explo-
sive devices (IEDs). Associated upgrades included increased armor, suspension and braking 
subsystems, and blast-attenuating seats.  Current Stryker Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) 
efforts are focused on improving command, control, communications, computers and intelli-
gence (C4I) capabilities, to include necessary in-vehicle network and electrical power up-
grades.  The most recent major upgrade centered on the addition of a 30mm cannon and turret 
to a percentage of the M1126 Stryker (flat-bottom hull) infantry carrier fleet.  The upgrade 
required a new 55,000 pound suspension and wider tires; fielding is scheduled to begin in July 
2018.     There are 10 variants of the flat-bottom hull (original) Stryker and seven variants of 
the double-V hull Stryker.  The unit production cost of the infantry carrier variant has increased 
from $1.42M in 2003 to $4.9M in 2012. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stryker] 
4. Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV).  The U.S. Marine Corps’ AAV was first produced in 
1972 to transport Marines from ships to shore.  It underwent a service-life-extension program 
(SLEP) in 1984, upgrading the engine, transmission, and weapon subsystems, and improving 
the overall maintainability of the vehicle.  In 1998, the AAV underwent a Rebuild-to-Standard 
Program to again upgrade the engine and suspension, and restore its reliability, availability and 
maintainability (RAM) to meet original requirements.  This effort extended the AAV’s ex-
pected service life to 2013, when it was scheduled to be replaced by the Advanced Amphibious 
Assault Vehicle (AAAV; renamed the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) in 2003); the 
EFV Program was cancelled in 2011.  The latest engineering efforts are related to survivability 
upgrades for approximately 30-40% of the AAV fleet.  Survivability upgrades are focused 
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principally on improving the underbelly blast protection of the flat-bottomed AAV7A1, which 
is currently capable of providing protection only against anti-personnel mine-levels of blast.  
The additional armor, seats, and other survivability enhancements add approximately 11,000 
pounds to the vehicle, requiring improvements to the marine drive train, powertrain, and mod-
ification to the suspension system.  The AAV service life end is now planned for 2030 (58 
years of service), to be replaced by the in-development Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV).   
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assault_Amphibious_Vehicle; http://www.janes.com/arti-
cle/75737/usmc-aav7a1s-set-for-survivability-upgrades]  
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APPENDIX B: REAL-WORLD EXAMPLE OF CONSEQUENCES OF NOT ACHIEVING 
RESERVE CAPACITY REQUIREMENTS 
The Oliver Hazard Perry-class Guided-Missile Frigate (FFG-7) of the U.S. Navy provides 
an excellent example of the consequences of not achieving reserve capacity (RC) requirements. 
Modernization potential is the ability of a warship to accept new equipment to avoid obsolescence. 
The long life of warships (25 or more years) and relatively short life of systems installed on the 
ships (7 to 10 years) made modernization potential important.  Over its lifetime, a warship will 
usually have much of its original equipment replaced by new, more capable systems.  From the 
outset of the program, space, weight, and stability margins for growth in the FFG-7 were mini-
mized.  The low margins were linked to the Navy's determination to restrain the size and cost of 
the ship.  As a result, the FFG-7, unlike most new warships, was unable to accommodate any new 
equipment beyond what was planned, unless compensating removals were included.  The two ar-
eas of particular concern were the reductions in (1) the service life weight RC, and (2) the future 
RC. 
 The service life weight RC allows for weight increases occurring during the life of the 
ship.  Normally, the RC for a ship this size would be about 150 tons. The RC in the FFG-7, how-
ever, was only 50 tons, or 100 tons less than normal.  The future growth weight RC is established 
to allow for unknown, but anticipated future modifications and new equipment approved by the 
Chief of Naval Operations.  This margin is intended to make new ships more adaptable to changing 
requirements, the increasing threat, and changes in technology.  In the FFG-7, there was no RC for 
unplanned future ship characteristic changes, which require additional space or increases in the 
ship's weight.  
In addition to the tight weight margins, opportunities for future growth were even further 
constrained by very limited space on the ship.  These space limitations could make some necessary 
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future improvements impractical if compensating equipment removals cannot be made.  This, in 
turn, could affect the capability of the ship to perform its mission against an increasing enemy 
threat.  
These limited opportunities for future ship modifications were a serious matter because 
major modernizations are almost always required in order to maintain an effective ship.  Histori-
cally these modernizations have usually required space, weight, and stability reservations.  The 
absence of weight and space margins for fitting new equipment beyond those already planned 
meant added risk that needed mid-life modernizations to keep the ships abreast of an increasing 
threat throughout their life will prove impractical. 
[http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/ffg-7.htm] 
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APPENDIX C: RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 1 DETAILS 
 
FIGURE 23. RO1 RIW SENSITIVITY FOR COST CRITERION 
 
FIGURE 24. RO1 RIW SENSITIVITY FOR AGILITY CRITERION 
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FIGURE 25. RO1 RIW SENSITIVITY FOR PAYLOAD CRITERION 
 
 
FIGURE 26. RO1 RIW SENSITIVITY FOR FLEXIBILITY CRITERION 
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FIGURE 27. RO1 RIW SENSITIVITY FOR MOBILITY CRITERION 
 
 
FIGURE 28. COMPARISON BETWEEN RO1 #1 AND #3 RANKED SYSTEM-SETS 
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FIGURE 29. COMPARISON BETWEEN RO1 #2 AND #3 RANKED SYSTEM-SETS 
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APPENDIX D: RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 2 DETAILS 
 
FIGURE 30. RO2 RIW SENSITIVITY FOR AGILITY CRITERION 
 
FIGURE 31. RO2 RIW SENSITIVITY FOR COST CRITERION 
Utility
Percent of Weight on Agility Measure
 1.000
 0.250
0 100
System-Set #1671
System-Set #1675
System-Set #1672
System-Set #1677
System-Set #1673
System-Set #1676
System-Set #1674
Preference Set = NE  PR F. SET
Utility
Percent of Weight on Cost ($) Measure
 0.923
 0.161
0 100
System-Set #1671
System-Set #1675
System-Set #1672
System-Set #1677
System-Set #1673
System-Set #1676
System-Set #1674
Preference Set = NEW PREF. SE
47.4%
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FIGURE 32. RO2 RIW SENSITIVITY FOR FLEXIBILITY CRITERION 
 
 
FIGURE 33. RO2 RIW SENSITIVITY FOR MOBILITY CRITERION 
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FIGURE 34. RO2 RIW SENSITIVITY FOR PAYLOAD CRITERION 
 
 
FIGURE 35. RO2 RIW SENSITIVITY FOR POWER RC CRITERION 
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FIGURE 36. RO2 RWI SENSITIVITY FOR REQ'D CAP MET CRITERION 
 
 
FIGURE 37. RO2 RWI SENSITIVITY FOR VOLUME RC CRITERION 
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FIGURE 38. COMPARISON BETWEEN RO2 #1 AND #3 RANKED SYSTEM-SETS 
 
 
FIGURE 39. COMPARISON BETWEEN RO2 #2 AND #3 RANKED SYSTEM-SETS 
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ABSTRACT 
ENHANCING SET-BASED DESIGN TO ENGINEER RESILIENCE FOR LONG-LIVED 
SYSTEMS 
by 
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Major: Industrial Engineering 
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy 
At the heart of Set-Based Design is the concept that down-select decisions are deferred 
until sufficient information is available to make a decision, i.e., a set of possible solutions is main-
tained.  Due to the extended service lives of many of our current and future systems, the horizon 
for accurately predicting the system’s requirement is shorter than the service life, so the needed 
information to down-select to a single optimized solution is unavailable at the time of fielding.  
Set-Based Design can, however, be extended to explicitly carry a set of possible solutions past the 
point of the initial fielding of the system by considering changeability, as enabled through de-
signed-in reserve capacity to accommodate additional volume, weight, power, cooling, and com-
puter performance.  Proposed is an analytical framework that enhances Set-Based Design to engi-
neer resilient systems with cost-effective post-production growth capability by means of reserve 
capacity and illustrate it through a case study.   
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